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DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CHILDREN IN
RENTAL HOUSING: A CALIFORNIA
PERSPECTIVE
Baxter Dunaway*
Timothy J. Blied**
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, one of the more noticeable trends in hous-
ing throughout the United States, and especially in California,
has been the growing number of families' with young children
who are seeking rental housing-as opposed to purchasing a
house or other housing accommodation. For some it is a matter
of personal preference. For most it is a matter of economic
necessity.' Regardless of their reasons for seeking rental hous-
ing, virtually all of these prospective tenants are quickly con-
fronted with the cold, hard fact that a substantial majority of
landlords do not wish to rent to adults who have children.3
In the great majority of states, including California, it cur-
rently is permissible for owners of rental properties to discrimi-
nate by refusing to rent to adults solely because they have
children, as well as to evict tenants solely because they have a
child during their tenancy.4 The legal issues raised by this form
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1. "Family" will be used throughout this article as a shorthand term for the
family unit, and as used herein it includes any household where there is at least one
parent and one or more minor children living with that parent.
2. For example, the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG)
surveyed the six southern California counties within its jurisdiction and found that
there were 1.6 million households with children, of which 604,000 (38%) were renters.
Of these renter families, 320,000 (53%) were inadequately housed as of January. 1976.
Southern Cal. Ass'n of Governments, Supplemental Report to SCAG Regional Housing
Allocation Model-Inadequately Housed Families with Children 2 (staff report 1977).
The SCAG report defined "inadequately housed" as households paying more than 25%
of gross income for housing, having more than 1.01 persons per room (overcrowding),
or living in substandard or dilapidated housing. Id. at 1.
3. To use the Los Angeles area as an example, renters' organizations which have
conducted informal surveys report that up to 80% of the total available apartment
units do not accept children. See Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1978, § 4, at 1, col. 4
(View).
4. Currently only six states have statutes which attempt to reach and abolish
discrimination against children in rental housing: Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1317
(West Supp. 1977-1978); Delaware, DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 6503 (1975); Illinois, ILL. ANN.
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of discrimination are complex and deep-rooted, ranging from
matters of statutory interpretation to fundamental questions
as to the proper scope and interpretation of constitutionally
guaranteed rights.' Aside from the purely legal problems which
arise from discrimination against children in rental housing,
the social and economic issues are of equal magnitude in both
complexity and importance.
This article will address the legal issues involved in the
refusal to rent to, or to continue to rent to, adults with children,
focusing primarily on the current situation in California. First,
the present legislative and judicial responses to the problem
will be considered. Second, possible federal and state constitu-
tional restrictions on this form of discrimination will be dis-
cussed. Finally, various suggestions and proposals for reform
will be evaluated, placing emphasis on their practicality in
light of current social and political realities.
ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT CALIFORNIA STATUTES
Nearly every state has at least one broad anti-
discrimination statute designed to reach private acts of dis-
crimination, patterned after the various federal civil rights
acts.' California is no exception. California's Unruh Civil
Rights Act, in its present form, expressly prohibits discrimina-
tion based upon "sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin." 7 In addition, California has its counterpart to the Fed-
STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (Supp. 1978); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B,
§ 4.11 (West Supp. 1978); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 170-192 (West 1971);
and New York, N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 236-237 (McKinney 1968).
5. Recent articles of note on the subject include: Note, Housing Discrimination
Against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559
(1977-1978); O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment for Rent-Children Not Allowed, 25 DE
PAuL L. REV. 64 (1975).
For a view of the problem from the other end of the age spectrum-retirement
communities, see generally Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforce-
ability of Residential Segregation by Age, 76 MICH. L. REV. 64 (1977); Comment,
Neither Seen Nor Heard: Keeping Children Out of Arizona's Adult Communities
Under Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-1317(B), 1975 ARIz. STATE L.J. 813.
6. A number of states have patterned their civil rights legislation after the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000g-3 (1970 &.Supp. V 1975), which
prohibits discrimination based upon race, color, religion, or national origin, but does
not prohibit discrimination based upon sex. See also the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which prohibits the states from depriving any person of
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or by statute.
For a brief but informative discussion of the various state statutes in this area,
see Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing
Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 572-75 (1977-1978).
7. CAL. Civ. ConE §§ 51-52 (West Supp. 1978). Strictly speaking, only section 51
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eral Fair Housing Act" in the Rumford Fair Housing Act.' The
Rumford Act, as amended in 1977, makes it unlawful for "the
owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against
any person because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital
status, national origin or ancestry of such person.""'
The language of both of these statutes, by specifying cer-
tain types of discrimination which are prohibited, taken by
itself would indicate a clear legislative intent to limit the cover-
age of each Act to discrimination based on the enumerated
factors. However, the Rumford Act also contains the provision
that "[n]othing contained in this part shall be construed to
prohibit selection based upon factors other than race, color,
religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry.""
Recent cases and opinions of the Attorney General have
construed the Unruh Civil Rights Act to broaden the effective
scope of the Act considerably. Although the Rumford Act has
up to this point been more limited in its application, the same
judicial rationale which led to the expansion of the coverage of
is the "Unruh Act," and section 52 merely supplies the remedies for its violation. In
practice, however, the two sections are normally cited together and treated as a unit.
Section 51 provides:
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil
Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national
origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege
on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable
alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, or national
origin.
Section 52 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever
makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex,
color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin contrary to the provisions
*of Section 51 or 51.5 of this code, is liable for each and every offense for
the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury,
or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the
amount of actual damage, but in no case less than two hundred fifty
dollars ($250), and such attorney's fees as may be determined by the
court in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights prohib-
ited in Section 51 or 51.5 of this code.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Federal Fair Housing Act
prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, as well as on the basis of sex. Id. § 3604 (Supp. V 1975).
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West Supp. 1978).
10. Id. at § 35720(1). For the full text of section 35720, see note 63 infra.
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35742 (West Supp. 1978). Cf. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 51 (West Supp. 1978) (equality of application).
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the Unruh Act could feasibly be applied to the Rumford Act
by the California courts. Moreover, several attempts have been
and will continue to be made by members of the California
Legislature to pass new legislation which would specifically
prohibit discrimination in rental housing against families.'"
The Unruh Civil Rights Act
A. Legislative History
Prior to 1959, section 51 of the California Civil Code
stated:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating
houses, places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind
are sold for consumption on the premises, barber shops,
bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, public conveyances
and all other places of public accommodations or amuse-
ment, subject only to the conditions and limitations estab-
lished by law, and applicable alike to all citizens.'"
In 1959 the legislature designated Civil Code section 51 as the
Unruh Civil Rights Act and amended it to read, in pertinent
part:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ances-
try or national origin are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges or serv-
12. In January, 1978, a bill that would have banned discrimination against fami-
lies in rental housing came within four votes of passage in the California State Senate.
S.B. No. 359, introduced by Senators David Roberti and Peter Behr on February 23,
1977, was voted down three times by the State Senate within a one year span of time.
In its final amended form, S.B. 359 provided that, with certain exceptions, any
person having the right to rent or lease a housing accommodation who refused to rent
or lease to any person "solely because such person has a minor child who will occupy
the leased or rented premises" would be liable to the person discriminated against as
provided in section 52 of the Civil Code. S.B. 359, 1976-77 Reg. Sess., § 3 (1977). S.B.
359 would have also made it illegal to "include in any lease or rental agreement for a
housing accommodation a clause providing that as a condition of continued tenancy
the tenants shall remain childless. ... Id. § 2.
On March 20, 1978, Assemblyman Roos introduced two separate bills, A.B. 2979
and A.B. 3000, each of which contains the provision that "lilt is unlawful for any
person to terminate the rental of housing accommodations based upon the age of the
tenant or the presence of children in his or her household, unless the facilities are
unsafe for such tenant or children." A.B. 2979, 1977-78 Reg. Sess., § 54400 (1978); A.B.
3000, § 6, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978). A.B. 2979 and A.B. 3000 died in committee.
13. CAl.. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1954).
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ices in all business establishments of every kind what-
soever.4
In 1961 the Unruh Act was again amended to substitute
"person" for "citizen" throughout the statute.'5 Most recently,
in 1974, "sex" was added to the list of prohibited bases of
discrimination.'" Hence, the legislative history of the Act
clearly indicates a pattern of successive attempts to stream-
line, to clarify and to improve the language of the Act, as well
as an attempt to specify carefully, and thus to limit, the pro-
hibited bases of discrimination.
B. Judicial Expansion of the Unruh Act
Of even greater significance than the legislative refine-
ments to the Unruh Act has been its interpretation and expan-
sion by the courts. The leading case construing the Act with a
view toward enlarging its scope was In re Cox,'7 in which the
California Supreme Court determined that the listing of spe-
cific types of discrimination in the Act was merely illustrative,
rather than restrictive, and that the history and the language
of the Act "disclose a clear and large design to interdict all
arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise."'"
The factual holding of Cox was that a shopping center
could not arbitrarily exclude persons from the premises merely
because they had long hair or wore unconventional dress. The
petitioner in Cox, before the Supreme Court of California via
a writ of habeas corpus, had been arrested at a shopping center
and charged with violating a municipal ordinance which pro-
hibited remaining upon "'business premises' after being
notified by the owner or lessee or person in charge thereof to
remove therefrom."'" The petitioner had apparently been
asked to leave the center because he was in the company of a
14. 1959 Cal. Stats. ch. 1866, § 1, at 4424 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE §
51 (West Supp. 1978)).
15. 1961 Cal. Stats. ch. 1187, § 1, at 2920 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE §
51 (West Supp. 1978)).
16. 1974 Cal. Stats. ch. 1193, § 1, at 2568 (current version at CAL. CiV. CODE §
51 (West Supp. 1978)).
17. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
18. Id. at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
19. Id. at 210 n.2, 474 P.2d at 994 n.2, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.2. The San Rafael
trespass ordinance in question, section 8.12.210 of the San Rafael Municipal Code,
interacted with the Unruh Act by providing that it would not be effective in an in-
stance in which "its application results in or is coupled with an act prohibited by the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. ... SAN RAFAEL, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.12.210 (1977).
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person who was a "long hair" and wore unusual attire."
The Cox court sought to define limits to its broad construc-
tion of the Unruh Act by explaining that:
In holding that the Civil Rights Act forbids a business
establishment generally open to the public from arbitrarily
excluding a prospective customer, we do not imply that the
establishment may never insist that a patron leave the
premises. Clearly an entrepreneur need not tolerate cus-
tomers who damage property, injure others, or otherwise
disrupt his business. A business establishment may, of
course, promulgate reasonable deportment regulations
that are rationally related to the services performed and
the facilities provided."
Of special significance in Cox was the court's discussion of
the legislative and decisional history of the Unruh Act. The
decision noted that two cases decided well before the 1959
amendments to the Unruh Act used the Act as a means to
reach specific instances of discrimination arguably not within
the prohibitory language of the Act. In Orloff v. Los Angeles
Turf Club," decided in 1951, the California Supreme Court
held that the Civil Rights Act barred a race track from expel-
ling a patron who had acquired "a reputation as a man of
immoral character." 3 Later that same year, in Stoumen v.
Reilly," the supreme court recognized the right of persons re-
puted to be homosexuals to obtain food and drink in a public
restaurant and bar.
In support of its contention that the Unruh Act should be
applied to all arbitrary discrimination, rather than being re-
stricted to the categories enumerated on the face of the statute
by the 1959 amendment, the Cox court reasoned that:
The Legislature enacted the 1959 amendment subse-
quent to our decisions in Orloff and Stoumen. Neither of
those cases restricted discrimination to 'race, color, reli-
gion, ancestry or national origin'-the particular incidents
20. 3 Cal. 3d at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
21. Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31. In subsequent California
decisions involving restrictions or regulations imposed by landlords, the courts have
shown a greater inclination to find stringent apartment standards "reasonable" and
"rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided" because a
shopping center is a business establishment "more open to the public." Newby v. Alto
Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 300-01, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1976). See
notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
22. 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
23. Id. at 736, 227 P.2d at 551.
24. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
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of discrimination specified in the 1959 amendment. We
must, of course, presume that the legislature was well
aware of these decisions. [citations] We cannot infer from
the 1959 amendment any legislative intent to deprive citi-
zens in general of the rights declared by the statute and
stanchioned by public policy."
Yet the court's conclusion in Cox that "in Stoumen and Orloff
this court clearly established that the Civil Rights Act prohib-
ited all arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations" 6
is, at best, questionable. A good argument can be made that
the Cox court's reliance on either Orloff or Stoumen as the
source of such a broad public policy statement is misplaced.
In Orloff, the plaintiff, an alleged bookmaker, had been
excluded from the defendant's race track based upon track
rules patterned after a Civil Code provision permitting the
ejection of "known undesirables, touts, . . . persons of lewd or
immoral character, and persons guilty of . . .conduct detri-
mental to racing or the public welfare." 7 The Orloff court held
that mere suspicion of off-track gambling activity by the plain-
tiff did not justify his exclusion from the track but rather,
"[ilt is a person's conduct when entering and attending a
public place to which the statutory standards apply."2
The court in Orloff also concluded that it was not the
legislative intent to vest in the race track management the
right to determine what persons were sufficiently moral to be
admitted. 9 Allowing such a determination, the court con-
25. 3 Cal. 3d at 215, 474 P.2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
26. Id. at 214, 474 P.2d at 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
27. 36 Cal. 2d at 737, 227 P.2d at 452. The track rules in question were promul-
gated by the California Horse Racing Board and found their basis in the provisions of
Civil Code section 53, as it existed in 1951. Id. at 736-37, 227 P.2d at 451-52. At that
time section 53 provided that while as a general rule persons over age twenty-one who
presented a valid admission ticket could not be refused admittance to places of "public
amusement or entertainment," an express statutory exception allowed the exclusion
of "lalny person under the influence of liquor, or who is guilty of boisterous conduct,
or any person of lewd or immoral character .... " 1905 Cal. Stats. ch. 413, § 3, at
554 (current version at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51, 52 (West Supp. 1978)).
28. 36 Cal. 2d at 741, 227 P.2d at 454. The court made a sharp distinction
between drunkenness, boisterous conduct, and lewd or immoral acts by patrons at the
track, and the private business affairs, personal relations with others, and past conduct
of patrons away from the track. The former actions are all "visible or readily ascertain-
able" at the time and place of entertainment. Conversely, the latter criteria, whether
or not they are reliable indicia of character, "are immaterial in the application of the
statutory standards under the facts of this case." Id. at 740-41, 227 P.2d at 454.
29. Id. The court questioned the indefiniteness of the "lewd or immoral charac-
ter" standard, but held that such indefiniteness was not fatal to the use of the word
"immorality" as a guide. Id. at 740, 227 P.2d at 453. However, it is interesting to note
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cluded, would be a denial of equal protection and due process.:",
Immediately after the Orloff decision, the legislature en-
acted a statute specifically providing that touts and gamblers
could be excluded from race tracks, but only after a hearing. :"
Thus, based on the fact that the language and holding of Orloff
are limited to the facts in that case, as well as on the subse-
quent legislative response of specifically providing for the ex-
clusion from race tracks of undesirable persons after a hearing,
it is difficult to find any support in Orloff for the Cox court's
finding that Orloff prohibited all arbitrary discrimination in
public accommodations.32 On the contrary, Orloff arguably
stands for little more than a failure of procedural due process
in the exclusion of persons from race tracks.
The second case extensively relied on in the Cox decision
was Stoumen v. Reilly.33 In Stoumen the State Board of Equali-
zation had suspended the plaintiff's liquor license based on its
finding that persons of known homosexual tendencies patron-
ized his restaurant and bar. 4 The supreme court held that this
was an improper ground for denial of plaintiff's license:
Members of the public of lawful age have a right to patron-
ize a public restaurant and bar so long as they are acting
properly and are not committing illegal or immoral acts;
the proprietor has no right to exclude or eject a patron
'except for good cause,' and if he does so without good
cause he is liable in damages. 5
that Civil Code section 53, along with its questionable right to exclude "lewd or immo-
ral" persons, was repealed in 1959. 1959 Cal. Stats. ch. 1866, § 3, at 4424.
The Cox court concluded that since the repeal of section 53 was contemporaneous
with the 1959 amendments to Civil Code section 51 to include all business establish-
ments, "[iln so doing the Legislature obviously intended to encompass within section
51 all of the enterprises theretofore governed by section 53 and to subject proprietors
of all businesses serving the public to the same requirement that there be no arbitrary
exclusion of would-be patrons." 3 Cal. 3d at 214-15 n.8, 474 P.2d at 997-98 n.8, 90 Cal.
Rptr. at 29-30 n.8.
30. 36 Cal. 2d at 741-42, 227 P.2d at 454.
31. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19561.5 (West 1954) (added by 1951 Cal.
Stats., ch. 1084, § 1, at 2813). Section 19561.5 was repealed in 1959 (1959 Cal. Stats.,
ch. 1828, § 1, at :4344), but the language and provisions of that section were carried
over without substantial change into sections 19572 and 19573 of the Business and
Professions Code (added by 1959 Cal. Stats., ch. 1828, § 2, at 4358). See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 19572-19573 (West 1964 & Supp. 1978). This legislation was upheld in
Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 55 Cal. 2d 736, 741-42, 361 P.2d 921, 923-24, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 203-04 (1961). See discussion in In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 215 n.9, 474 P.2d at
998 n.9, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30 n.9.
32. 3 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 474 P.2d at 996-97, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
33. 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
34. Id. at 716, 234 P.2d at 970.
35. Id.
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The "except for good cause" language relied on by the
Stoumen court was drawn from Civil Code section 52 which,
prior to 1959, stated in part: "whoever makes any discrimina-
tion, distinction or restriction on account of color or race, or
except for good cause, applicable alike to citizens of every color
or race whatsoever . . . is liable for damages . " In 1959,
eight years after the Stoumen decision, the legislature
amended Civil Code section 52 to delete the "except for good
cause" provision and provide for liability under section 52 only
for the specifically enumerated types of discrimination set
forth in Civil Code section 51.11
Accordingly, it is difficult to follow the court's reasoning
in Cox that the Stoumen decision and the subsequent legisla-
tive amendments support a legislative intent to have sections
51 and 52 of the Civil Code interpreted as a broad prohibition
of all arbitrary discrimination. The Stoumen court merely ap-
plied the applicable statute-Civil Code section 52-as it read
in 1951. No attempt was made in the brief decision to step
beyond the facts at issue or to dictate that the Civil Rights Act
prohibited all arbitrary discrimination in public accommoda-
tions.
Although the Cox court appeared to be straining consider-
ably to find legislative and decisional intent that the Civil
Rights Act prohibits discriminatory acts other than the specific
categories listed on the face of the statute by the 1959 amend-
ment, it should be noted that the court was faced with a diffi-
cult factual situation. The petitioner in Cox, intending to make
a purchase at a shopping center, had been arrested and charged
with a criminal offense merely because he had refused to leave
the shopping center. The security guard who asked him to leave
would not give any reason, but it was apparently because the
petitioner was talking with a person "who wore long hair and
dressed in an unconventional manner. '"" Confronted with such
a blatant and arbitrary act of discrimination by a shopping
center, the "modern analogue of the town center,""5 the court
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 52 (West 1954).
37. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. The deletion of the language
"except for good cause" was not merely an oversight by the legislature. The legislative
history reveals that the language was specifically deleted; however, no reason for
the deletion is revealed in history. For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative
changes, see Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in "Business Establish-
ments" Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 So. CAL. L. REV. 260, 264-70
(1960).
38. 3 Cal. 3d at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
39. Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The Cox court based its
19791
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was obviously of a mind to find legislative or judicial intent to
prevent such discrimination.
C. Post-Cox Developments
As mentioned above, the California Legislature amended
the Unruh Act in 1974 to add "sex" to the list of prohibited
types of discrimination.' Just as the legislature was deemed by
the Cox court to be aware of the Orloff and Stoumen decisions
at the time it incorporated the 1959 amendments into the
Unruh Act,' so also it must be assumed that the legislature was
aware of the decision in Cox at the time of the 1974 amendment
to the Act. Yet, the legislature in 1974 chose not to codify the
"all arbitrary discrimination" language of Cox. Instead, it
maintained and even added to the specific list of prohibited
bases of discrimination set forth in the Unruh Act. Thus, by
implication at least, it would appear that the rationale of Cox,
if not its holding, has been rejected by the Legislature.2
It is not clear whether the California Supreme Court would
still adhere to its interpretation in Cox that the Unruh Act is
intended to encompass all arbitrary discrimination. No su-
preme court decision since the Cox decision in 1970 has con-
strued the Unruh Act. 43
comparison of the modern shopping center to a town or city on the fact that shopping
centers "perform an important public function. In some areas the public must rely
upon the shopping center as its sole source of food, clothing and other commodities. If
a shopping center arbitrarily denies individuals the right to purchase essentials, these
people may have no practicable alternative source of supply." Id. at 218, 474 P.2d at
1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
40. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
41. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
42. Discrimination solely on the basis of sex by business establishments would
appear to be clearly arbitrary, and hence, if the legislature thought that the Unruh Act
already covered sex discrimination after Cox, there would have been no need to amend
the Act to specify "sex." Indeed, the logical amendment would have been to codify
the "all arbitrary discrimination" language contained in Cox.
43. In S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1976), the California Supreme Court held that the defendant tenants stated
a valid defense to unlawful detainer proceedings brought by their landlord. They
alleged that they were being evicted in retaliation for their filing suit against plain-
tiff in federal court, charging him with violations of the Federal Farm Labor Contractor
Registration Act of 1963. The court did not decide nor even discuss the validity of
defendants' additional contention that the actions of the plaintiff landlord constituted
arbitrary discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act. Id. at 730 n.5, 552 P.2d at 728
n.5, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 768 n.5.
The California Second District Court of Appeal, in Marsh v. Edwards Theatres
Circuit, Inc., 64 Cal. App. 3d 881, 134 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1976), has already taken the
position that the Unruh Act does not apply to discrimination-whether or not it is ar-
bitrary-against the physically handicapped. As the Marsh court pointed out, Civil
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D. Applicability of the Unruh Act to Rental Housing
The Unruh Act prohibits discrimination on the specified
bases in "all business establishments of every kind what-
soever."44 Yet, there are no guidelines in the Unruh Act itself
as to what this phrase encompasses. In light of the relevant
California appellate decisions construing this phrase,45 the Cal-
ifornia Attorney General's office no doubt correctly concluded
in a recent opinion that "interpreted in the broadest sense
reasonably possible, [it] includes the sale, rental, or lease of
property for value."" Therefore, assuming that the Act does
apply to rental housing and that the California Supreme Court
would still interpret the Act to prohibit all arbitrary discrimi-
nation, the issue which remains unresolved is whether the re-
fusal of a landlord to rent to families merely because they have
children constitutes arbitrary discrimination within the pur-
view of the Unruh Act.
Because of the sweeping importance of the decision in Cox,
California appellate courts subsequently called upon to con-
strue claims of arbitrary housing discrimination based on the
Unruh Act have relied heavily on the language in Cox that a
business can "promulgate reasonable deportment regulations
that are rationally related to the services performed and the
facilities provided." In Flowers v. John Burnham & Co.,4" the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was called upon to decide
whether or not a landlord's policy of limiting children in its
Code section 54.1, dealing specifically with discrimination against the physically hand-
icapped, was enacted after Civil Code section 51. Therefore, the rule that "jai special
statute dealing expressly with a particular subject controls and takes precedence over
a more general statute covering the same subject" is applicable. Id. at 890, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 849.
44. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1978).
45. See, e.g., Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-69, 370 P.2d
313, 315-16, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611-12 (1962) (sale of a house in a tract by the developer
constituted a "business establishment"); Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321,
20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962) (real estate brokers are within the purview of the Unruh Act);
Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 253, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309,
317 (1962) (renting housing accommodations is a "business"); Swann v. Burkett, 209
Cal. App. 2d 685, 695, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286, 292 (1963) (renting units in a triplex dwelling
is operating a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act).
46. 56 Ops. CAL. Ai'r'y GEN. 546, 551 (1973). The Attorney General's office fur-
ther opined that "Civil Code section 51 includes within its scope owners of triplexes,
owners of duplexes, owners of non-owner occupied single family dwellings, and any
other owners of housing accommodations as defined in the Rumford Fair Housing Act
. ... Id. at 546.
47. 3 Cal. 3d at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31. See note 21 and
accompanying text supra.
48. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1972).
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apartments to "girls of all ages and boys under five" was arbi-
trary under the standard set forth in Cox.4" The Flowers court
concluded that "[b]ecause the independence, mischie-
viousness, boisterousness and rowdyism of children vary by age
and sex," the landlord's policy was neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary and thus was not in violation of the Unruh Act.5"
In 1975 the California Attorney General was asked to ren-
der an opinion as to whether the Unruh Act "prohibit[s] forms
of discrimination other than those specifically enumerated
therein with regard to the sale or rental of real property; for
example, occupation, marital status, or number of children."',
The resulting opinion relied on Cox for the proposition that the
Unruh Act prohibits all forms of arbitrary discrimination, in-
cluding discrimination in the sale or rental of real property. 2
However, with respect to the specific categories cited in the
opinion request, the Attorney General sidestepped the issue
somewhat by stating that:
In the absence of specific facts of the nature of the property
being sold or rented, its location, the size of the property,
and the size of the entity of individual involved in the sale
or rental of the real property, and in the absence of facts
as to the nature of the occupation, the type of marital
status, or the numbers of children involved in the classifi-
cation, no definitive answer can be given as to what would
or would not constitute discrimination which would be in
violation of Civil Code Section 51.
The denial of housing accommodations because of
one's occupation, marital status, or number of children,
may or may not be violative of the Act depending on
whether any regulations denying such housing accommo-
dations are reasonable and somehow rationally related to
the services performed and the facilities provided. 53
49. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. The plaintiffs in Flowers were tenants who
had four children, two girls aged one and three, and two boys aged eight and ten. Less
than two weeks after plaintiffs moved into defendant's apartment complex, they re-
ceived a 30-day notice to quit the premises pursuant to Civil Code section 1946. Plain-
tiffs then brought suit, alleging a violation of the Unruh Act, as well as of their parental
and marital rights to "have and raise their male children in a home of their own
choice." Id. at 702, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
50. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. At the time Flowers was decided, the specified
forms of discrimination listed in the Unruh Act did not include sex. As noted pre-
viously (see text accompanying note 16 supra), sex was added to the list in 1974. It is
doubtful, therefore, that the Flowers court would have reached the same conclusion if
the case were decided today.
51. 58 Ops. CAL. Arr'Y GEN. 608 (1975).
52. Id. at 613.
53. Id. The opinion went on to state by way of illustration that the owner of an
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In Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments,54 the landlord had
announced a rent increase and plaintiff, a tenant, was instru-
mental in organizing a tenant protest. After several heated
discussions between the resident manager and the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was given a thirty-day eviction notice, but no further
proceedings to evict were undertaken. Plaintiff then brought
suit against the owners and managers seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief in connection with the threatened eviction.
One of plaintiff's causes of action was for damages based on
alleged arbitrary discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act.55
The First District Court of Appeal ruled in Newby that the
actions of the apartment owners and manager did not consti-
tute a violation of the Unruh Act." The Newby court relied on
the Cox standard, as had the court in Flowers. It first posed,
and then answered in the affirmative, the question of whether
the actions of the defendant owners and manager were
"reasonable" and "rationally related to the facilities pro-
vided."5 The court concluded that actions-such as evictions
and eviction threats-taken by a landlord to protect his own
economic interest in promoting a "quiet and peaceable envi-
ronment free from the threat of rent strikes and to prevent
tenants from organizing to protest rent increases" are ration-
ally related to the renting of apartments.58
In June of 1978, the First District Court of Appeal held, in
Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Association,"5 that a pro-
vision in the bylaws of a condominium association restricting
occupancy of condominium units to persons eighteen years of
age or older was not an unreasonable restriction upon either a
condominium owner's right to sell or to lease his condominium
or upon his right of occupancy. Responding to the plaintiff's
apartment complex could "justifiably establish itself to serve elderly people, have
special facilities and services for them, and design the complex for maximum quiet and
restfulness." Id. Denial of an apartment to a family would not be arbitrary under these
circumstances. "Similarly, a landlord would probably not be 'arbitrary' in refusing to
rent a one-bedroom apartment to a family with four children, as interests of health
and safety are also involved." Id.
54. 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1976).
55. Id. at 299, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
56. Id. at 302, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57.
57. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
58. Id. at 301-02, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57. Furthermore, the court noted that an
apartment landlord "in exercising controls 'rationally related to the facilities provided'
might reasonably impose more stringent standards than an owner of a business estab-
lishment more open to the public," such as the shopping center in Cox. Id. at 300-01,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
59. 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
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contention that age restrictions are per se unreasonable, the
Ritchey court reiterated the principle that whether a given age
restriction is reasonable is to be determined in light of the
circumstances of each individual case."
As the pertinent cases and opinions of the Attorney Gen-
eral indicate, families seeking rental housing in California have
found little solace in the fact that the Unruh Act purports to
prohibit arbitrary discrimination in rental housing. Under the
standards set forth in Cox, to avoid liability a California land-
lord wishing to designate an apartment complex as "adults
only" merely has to demonstrate that the regulation excluding
children is rationally related to the services performed and the
facilities provided. An apartment complex designed for the
maximum peace and quiet of the tenants, one lacking proper
play facilities or safety precautions for children, or simply a
landlord's economic self-interest in avoiding the destructive
tendencies of children would each appear to be permissible
reasons for excluding children under the Unruh Act, so long as
there is no indication of discrimination on the prohibited bases
of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
The Rumford Fair Housing Act
A. Legislative History and Intent
The Rumford Fair Housing Act, "' originally enacted in
1959,12 was amended in 1977 to include within its coverage all
housing accommodations, public and private. 3 Prior to the
60. Id. at 694, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 699. The opinion in Ritchey cited Flowers, but
placed principal reliance on Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974),
an Arizona decision upholding a private covenant in a deed restricting occupancy of a
housing subdivision to persons twenty-one years of age or older.
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35745 (West Supp. 1978).
62. The original act, entitled "Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing,"
was added by 1959 Cal. Stats. ch. 1681, § 1, at 4074 (repealed 1963). The present Act
was added by 1963 Cal. Stats. ch. 1853, § 2, at 3823, and was entitled "Discrimination
in Housing." The heading of the act was amended to read "Fair Housing Law" by 1977
Cal. Stats. ch. 1187, § 1, at 1187.
63. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35720 (West Supp. 1978). Section 35720,
defining prohibited discrimination, has been amended three times since its original
enactment in 1963. In 1974, section 35720 was amended to include a provision prohibit-
ing any owner of housing accommodations to harass, evict, or otherwise discriminate
against any person in the sale or rental of housing in retaliation for that person's
opposition to practices unlawful under the Rumford Act. A 1975 amendment to section
35720 added "sex" and "marital status" to the list of prohibited bases of discrimina-
tion. Finally, section 35720 was rewritten by the 1977 amendment to read as follows:
It shall be unlawful:
1. For the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate
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1977 amendment, the Rumford Act did not attempt to reach
acts of discrimination by the owners of private dwellings con-
taining four or less units. 4
Unlike the Unruh Act, which provides for private enforce-
ment by persons against whom there has been discrimination,"
the Rumford Act specifies that the State Fair Employment
Practice Commission" and the Department of Industrial Rela-
tions' Division of Fair Employment Practices are empowered
to prevent and eliminate discrimination in housing. 7 However,
the Rumford Act does contain a provision which gives the Fair
Employment Practice Commission jurisdiction over persons
"subject to the provisions of Section 51 of the Civil Code [the
Unruh Act], as that section applies to housing accommoda-
tions ..." who discriminate on the basis of "race, color, reli-
against any person because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital status,
national origin, or ancestry of such person.
2. For the owner of any housing accommodation to make or to cause
to be made any written or oral inquiry concerning the race, color, religion,
sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry of any person seeking to
purchase, rent or lease any housing accommodation.
3. For any person to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made,
printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with re-
spect to the sale or rental limitation, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry or an in-
tention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.
4. For any person subject to the provisions of Section 51 of the Civil
Code, as that section applies to housing accommodations, as defined in
this part, to discriminate against any person because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry with reference
thereto.
5. For any person, bank, mortgage company or other financial insti-
tution to whom application is made for financial assistance for the pur-
chase, organization, or construction of any housing accommodation to
discriminate against any person or persons, or of prospective occupants
or tenants, in the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining
or use of any such financial assistance.
6. For any owner of housing accommodations to harass, evict, or
otherwise discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of housing
accommodations when the owner's dominant purpose is retaliation
against a person who has testified or assisted in any proceeding under this
part. Nothing herein is intended to cause or permit the delay of an unlaw-
ful detainer action.
7. For any person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of
any of the acts or practices declared unlawful in this section, or to at-
tempt to do so.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35270 (West Supp. 1978).
64. Id. § 35720(5) (West 1973).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West Supp. 1978). See note 7 supra for text.
66. The State Fair Employment Practice Commission, created by section 1414
of the Labor Code, is a seven member panel appointed to four year terms by the
Governor. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1414 (West 1971).
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35730 (West Supp. 1978).
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gion, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry . . . .""
Furthermore, the Legislature, possibly foreseeing a potential
for conflicting interpretations or decisions under the Rumford
Act and the Unruh Act, expressly provided in section 35743 of
the Rumford Act that "[n]othing contained in this part shall
be construed to, in any manner or way, limit or restrict the
application of Section 51 of the Civil Code.""
However, with respect to attempts to regulate discrimina-
tion in housing at the city or county level, section 35743 states
that it is the intent of the legislature that the Rumford Act
preempt such regulations, at least to the extent that they deal
with those areas of discrimination covered by Rumford."' But
since the Rumford Act, as presently construed and amended,7
does not address itself to the issue of discrimination against
families in rental housing, it follows that city and county regu-
lations in this area are not currently preempted."2
B. Applicability of the Rumford Act to Housing Discrim-
ination Against Children
The California courts have not attempted to construe the
Rumford Fair Housing Act as prohibiting "all arbitrary dis-
crimination," because the Act does contain the provision that
"[n]othing in this part shall be construed to prohibit selection
based upon factors other than race, color, religion, sex, marital
status, national origin, or ancestry."73 Therefore, it is necessary
to look to the specifically enumerated list of prohibited bases
for discrimination to determine whether the Rumford Act
makes discrimination against children in rental housing illegal.
The focus, necessarily, is on the meaning of the term "marital
68. Id. § 35720(4). As used in the Rumford Act, the term "housing accommoda-
tion" is broadly construed to include "any improved or unimproved real property, or
portion thereof, which is used or occupied, as the home, residence, or sleeping place of
one or more human beings. ... Id. § 35710(f).
69. Id. § 35743 (West 1973).
70. Id. For a more complete discussion of the preemptive powers and scope of
the Rumford Fair Housing Act, see 60 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 44 (1977) (county ordi-
nance establishing an "affirmative marketing program" to promote racially balanced
communities would be preempted by the Rumford Act).
71. A.B. 3000, which has died in committee in the California Assembly,
was a proposal to amend the Rumford Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination
against tenants who have children during the course of their tenancy in rental
housing. If it had been enacted, this provision would arguably have preempted local
efforts to deal with the issue of discrimination against children in rental housing. A.B.
3000, 1977-78 Reg. Sess. (1978). See note 12 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 147 infra.
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35742 (West Supp. 1978).
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status" as used in the Act.
The only California case to consider and construe the term
"marital status," Atkisson v. Kern Counting Housing Au-
thority," held that the Rumford Act prohibited eviction of
tenants by the county housing authority solely on the ground
that a man and a woman "cohabiting" an apartment were
unmarried.75 For the moment it would appear that the statu-
tory prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status
is limited to a factual situation like that in Atkisson-a land-
lord may not base his decision of whether to rent on whether
the tenants or applicants are single or married. " It remains to
be seen whether the courts will choose to expand the scope of
the term "marital status" to include an implicit prohibition
against discrimination against families in rental housing.77 At
present, it can safely be asserted that the Rumford Fair Hous-
ing Act is not applicable to the family rental housing discrimi-
nation issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The due process and equal protection clauses of both the
United States 8 and California" Constitutions provide, in sub-
stantially the same terms, 80 that the state may not deprive any
74. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
75. Id. at 99, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 381. In Atkisson, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
first ruled the Housing Authority's policy enjoining a tenant from "living with anyone
of the opposite sex to whom the tenant is not related by blood, marriage or adoption"
was invalid on various constitutional grounds. The court then applied the "marital
status" standard of the Rumford Act, noting that a literal application of the statute
may well have rendered the constitutional considerations moot. Id. at 99-100, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 381-82.
76. In Atkisson, for example, the fact that the plaintiff tenant had six children
from a previous marriage living with her was apparently not considered relevant to the
discussion of the Rumford Act by the court.
77. It is interesting to note that the term "discrimination" as defined in the
Rumford Act "includes the provision of segregated or separated housing accommoda-
tions." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35710(d) (West Supp. 1978). Therefore, if the
courts were to construe "marital status" to include a prohibition against discrimina-
tion against families in rental housing, it would not be acceptable under the act for
apartment complexes to designate certain areas as "family" areas and others as "adult
only" areas.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
79. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7, provides in pertinent part: "A person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protec-
tion of the laws."
80. Section 7 of article I of the California Constitution has been held to be
identical in scope and purpose to the fourteenth amendment of the United States
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person of his basic rights to due process and to the equal protec-
tion of the law. To bring due process, equal protection, and
other constitutional safeguards of individual rights into play,
there must first be some "state action" involved.8' The issue of
discrimination against families in rental housing presents the
following constitutional questions. In the absence of a statute
prohibiting such discrimination against families, does the use
by a private landlord of judicially enforced eviction procedures
to evict tenants with children constitute sufficient state action
to make the constitutional guarantees applicable? What possi-
ble state action is involved when a family is initially refused
housing accommodations by a private landlord solely because
they have children? Assuming, arguendo, that the initial hur-
dle of finding the required state action could be overcome, by
what standard and with what probable result should this form
of discrimination be judged for constitutional purposes? There
are no clear-cut answers for these questions. In the final analy-
sis, all that can be suggested is a set of reasonably broad guide-
lines or parameters, indicating the strengths and weaknesses of
the various constitutional arguments against discrimination
against children in rental housing.
The State Action Issue
It is axiomatic that the constitutional protections afforded
to individuals by the fourteenth amendment apply to inhibit
only state action and do not offer recourse against private acts
of discrimination-no matter how repugnant.2 However, the
United States Supreme Court has, in a series of decisions,
broadly construed the term "state action" so as to include cer-
tain actions taken by seemingly private individuals or organi-
zations. The two basic theories which have evolved for charac-
terizing private activities as state action are the "public func-
tion" theory 3 and the "state contacts" theory. 4
Constitution. See Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 245,
22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 311 (1962) (citing Manford v. Singh, 40 Cal. App. 700, 181 P. 844
(1919)).
81. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 11-13 (1883).
82. "The action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
only such action as may be fairly said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 334
U.S. at 13.
83. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (proprietor of privately
owned "company town" held subject to the constraints of the first and fourteenth
amendments "since [its] operation is essentially a public function"); Smith v. All-
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A landmark decision which extended the "state contacts"
theory to its reasonable limits was Shelley v. Kraemer,5 in
which the Supreme Court ruled that the judicial enforcement
of private racial discrimination makes that discrimination sub-
ject to the fourteenth amendment because of the significant
state participation in the discrimination via the state courts."
Shelley involved the state court enforcement of a racially re-
strictive covenant signed by all the homeowners in a white
neighborhood which provided for injunctive relief against any
sale by a white homeowner to a black person.
Taken to its logical extreme, the Court's decision in
Shelley could be viewed as prohibiting the state action in-
volved in the judicial enforcement of private discrimination
whenever state legislation, or a local ordinance imposing the
same prohibition, would violate any rights guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. However, the Supreme Court has
never extended the Shelley doctrine beyond the area of
racially-restrictive covenants.87
The California courts, applying the Shelley doctrine, have
held that tenants are entitled to raise, in unlawful detainer
proceedings brought against them in state courts, the equitable
defense that the use of the courts to evict them solely on the
basis of race constitutes a prohibited state action.88 Conversely,
however, the California Supreme Court has also ruled that
wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Democratic party of Texas held to be performing a public
function in conducting a primary election). But see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976) (holding that the "company town" rationale does not extend to the passageways
in a privately-owned shopping center).
84. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state
action found where private restaurant lessee in a state-owned parking facility refused
to serve blacks); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (private trustees under a private
will devising property to a city to be used for a park excluding blacks held subject to
fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees because of significant state partic-
ipation in control and maintenance of the park). But see Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972) (no state action where a private club which had no public funding, but did
have a state liquor license, discriminated racially in its dining room).
85. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
86. The Shelley Court recognized that racially-restrictive covenants-
voluntarily adhered to-remain valid as between private parties, but are unenforce-
able if the private discriminator seeks the aid of the courts to carry out his
purpose, either via specific performance, as in Shelley, or through the awarding of
damages. Id. at 13. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
87. Furthermore, it has been suggested by at least one lower federal court that
the finding of the requisite state action might be more difficult in the case of discrimi-
nation on other than racial grounds. See Edward v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 692-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
88. Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1962).
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there is not sufficient state action to justify injunctive relief
when a landlord merely serves a notice to quit on a tenant, even
if the sole motivation for the eviction is racial."
Given the present state of the case law, it is apparent that
refusal by private landlords to rent to families in the first place
is immune from attack under the fourteenth amendment be-
cause the requisite state action is lacking.9 If such discrimina-
tion is to be prohibited, it will have to be by means of a state
or local statute. Although there is no case law on point, it is
doubtful whether the California courts would be willing to ex-
tend the Shelley doctrine to find state action in a landlord's use
of the courts to evict a tenant based on the fact that the tenant
has children, as long as no racial discrimination is present.
Finally, even with state action, it would also be necessary to
find that the state was participating in the impermissible de-
nial of a right safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment-that
is, a denial of equal protection or due process.
Equal Protection Issues
The Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered standard
for determining whether the state has denied an individual
equal protection of the law. Most classifications of individuals
made by a state, especially those contained in economic or
social legislation, are subject to very limited judicial review.
The classification is presumed valid and will be upheld by the
courts, unless no rational basis and reasonable relation to a
valid state objective can be found." Furthermore, the burden
of proof that the classification is wholly arbitrary and bears no
reasonable relation to the object of the legislation is on the
person challenging the classification.
89. Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966); see also
Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 295, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 552
(1976).
90. One lower federal court has specifically found that discriminatory practices
by a private landlord do not involve any state action and cannot be reached by the
courts except via a statute. Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2d Cir.
1975).
91. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919).
92. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). Classifications
having a reasonable basis do not violate the fourteenth amendment merely because
they lack "mathematical nicety" or result in "some inequality." Id. at 78.
Hence, under the rational basis standard, the test for determining whether a
classification is valid is similar to the arbitrariness test set forth in Cox to determine
whether or not discrimination violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act. See note 21 and
accompanying text supra.
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If a court should require no more than a rational basis for
discrimination against families in rental housing, it is probable
that the policy of excluding children will be upheld. " Permissi-
ble objectives might include the landlord's economic self-
interest in avoiding the extra costs of safety features, mainte-
nance and repairs occasioned by the presence of children, as
well as the interest of other adult tenants in privacy and a
tranquil and peaceful atmosphere.
Tenants with children wishing to avoid eviction from their
apartment-or seeking to find rental housing in the first
place-will of course argue that discrimination against them by
a landlord solely on the basis of having children should be
subjected to strict judicial review, because a classification
based on the presence or age of children is a constitutionally
"suspect" class and also deprives them of certain
"fundamental rights" protected by the Constitution. If the ten-
ants are successful in their argument and convince the court
that either a suspect classification or a fundamental right is
involved, then the court will subject the classification to "strict
scrutiny."94 In order to prevail, the state must then meet the
difficult burden of showing that the classification serves a
"compelling state interest.""
At the present time, the categories which the Supreme
Court has expressly declared to be "suspect" are race,"5 na-
tional origin,97 and alienage. 8 Those rights which the Supreme
Court has defined as "fundamental rights" presently include
only the right to travel,9 the right to vote," ' freedom of associa-
93. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974) (applying
the rational basis standard in upholding a covenant in a deed restricting occupancy
of a subdivision to persons twenty-one years of age or older). Recently, however,
the Supreme Court has found certain state laws unconstitutionally "arbitrary" or
"irrational" under the rational basis standard of review. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (preference given to men over women as between persons equally-
qualified under state law to administer estates held invalid); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a law denying illegitimates the right to re-
cover for the wrongful death of their mother).
94. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
95. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
96. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
97. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633, 640 (1948).
98. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
99. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 758-59 (1966).
100. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v.
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tion,'0 ' and various personal privacy rights, including the right
to marry,'02 the right of procreation,'0 the right to use contra-
ceptives, 04 the right to an abortion,'05 and the right to educate
one's children as one chooses.'00 Moreover, the Court has ex-
pressly rejected the contentions that "age" is a suspect crit-
erion'07 or that "housing" is a fundamental right.'5
Because discrimination against families in rental housing
does not fit within any of the presently recognized suspect cate-
gories, and in view of the fact that age-based classifications are
not considered suspect, it seems clear that the courts will sub-
ject classifications excluding children from rental housing to
"strict scrutiny" only if it can be established that such discrim-
ination abridges a fundamental right. Of the list set forth
above, it is arguable that at least two-the right to travel and
the rights of personal privacy-might be applicable.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
101. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 23-31 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
102. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
103. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189
(1973).
106. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U..S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
107. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976)
(upholding mandatory retirement at age fifty for state police).
In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that
the test which is applied to determine whether a classification is suspect is whether
the category burdens a "discrete and insular minority for whom such heightened judi-
cial solicitude is appropriate." The Court has apparently adopted a restrictive inter-
pretation of this test because it has strongly resisted any expansion of the list of suspect
categories. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (sex); Matthews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (illegitimacy); San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973) (wealth).
108. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). In Lindsey, the Court rejected
the argument that the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful
possession of one's home" are fundamental rights. Id. at 73. The petitioners in Lindsey,
who were tenants, contended that the Oregon unlawful detainer statute was invalid
for equal protection purposes because of the relatively short period of time allowed for
litigation and the narrow range of issues that could be considered. In dismissing the
argument that housing is a fundamental right, the Court stated: "We do not denigrate
the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill . . . .Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant
relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions." Id. at 74.
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A. The Right to Travel
Although nowhere expressly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, the right to travel freely from state to state has been
repeatedly held to be a part of the "liberty" protected by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.'" 9 As developed by the case
law, the right has come to include not only the right to freedom
of movement from state to state, but also the right to take up
residence in the state of one's choice."" The decisions which
have struck down state action imposing burdens on the right
to travel have almost exclusively involved classifications aimed
at transients, that is, discrimination against a class of persons
solely because they have recently moved into a state."'
Conversely, attempts to utilize the right to travel as a
means of invalidating local housing restrictions have not been
successful to date. The pertinent cases have chiefly involved
restrictive zoning ordinances. In Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, '2 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the con-
stitutionality of a zoning ordinance which operated both to
limit land use to single family dwellings and to prohibit occu-
pancy of a dwelling by more than two unrelated persons. Plain-
tiffs, who were the owners of a house and several unrelated
tenants, challenged the zoning ordinance on equal protection
grounds, arguing unsuccessfully that it was violative of their
fundamental rights of travel, association, and privacy. Apply-
ing the rational basis standard of review, the Court held that
the ordinance infringed on neither the right to travel-because
109. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)
(the right to interstate travel occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our
federal union).
110. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972). The Supreme Court has thus
far declined to decide whether the right to travel and to settle at a chosen place applies
also to settlement in a particular locale by intrastate as well as interstate travelers.
See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974). At least one
circuit court of appeals has expressly held that no constitutional distinction exists
between interstate and intrastate travel. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442
F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
111. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974). Cases invalidating
"waiting period" or so-called "durational residency" requirements include: Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one year waiting period for free non-
emergency medical care of indigents invalidated); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (one year residency requirement for voting invalidated); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year waiting period for welfare assistance invalidated). But
cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (one year residency requirement for divorce
upheld); Martson v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (fifty day residency requirement for
voting upheld).
112. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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it was not "aimed at transients"" 3-nor upon any other funda-
mental right. Hence, the ordinance was upheld as a valid land
use regulation addressed to family needs."4
In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v.
City of Petaluma, ' a federal district court found that a
planned growth plan which sought to regulate the rate of
growth in the city of Petaluma, California, constituted an in-
valid infringement upon the right to travel. Specifically, the
trial court ruled that the city's desire to preserve its rural,
small-town character was "not a compelling governmental in-
terest.""' However, most, if not all, of the precedential value
of Petaluma was destroyed when the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court decision, holding that the
plaintiffs in Petaluma did not have standing to raise the issue
of interference with future residents' rights to travel."7
Accordingly, as one commentator has noted: "[W]hile
the courts have recognized that the right to travel exists, and
while it has been applied in cases involving situations other
than land-use controls, it is not clear how a zoning case would
be framed under the present state of the law.""" Where a pri-
vate landlord refuses to rent to families with children, the
chances of any right to travel argument being successful are
even more remote.
B. Right of Privacy
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,"' the Supreme Court affirmed
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 9. The Court concluded that "[a] quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs." Id.
115. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), reu'd. on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
116. 375 F. Supp. at 586.
117. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). The same
conclusion was reached as to a developer, faced with growth restrictions, asserting the
right to travel of future residents in Rasmussen v. City of Lake Forest, 404 F. Supp.
148 (N.D. I1. 1975).
118. D. MosKowITz, EXCLUSIONARY LAND ZONING 182 (1977). At least one court,
however, has ruled that a zoning ordinance which was designed to (and in fact did)
exclude children from a municipality violated the equal protection clause. In Molino
v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971),
a New Jersey court struck down a zoning ordinance which admittedly sought to ex-
clude children because they would require more schools, and hence, higher taxes.
However, it is important to note that Molino was decided prior to Belle Terre, where
the Supreme Court expressly found that a quiet, low-density village is a permissible
state objective, and exclusionary zoning ordinances are rational means of achieving
such an objective. See note 114 supra.
119. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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that "[miarriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race."'"" Subsequent Court deci-
sions have expanded the rights of procreation and marital pri-
vacy so as to preclude unwarranted governmental interference
with the freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life.'2 ' Furthermore, the Court has recognized that
these protected marital and family privacy rights extend be-
yond matters involving merely the right of procreation. In
Loving v. Virginia,"' the Court held that freedom to marry the
person of one's own choosing is "one of the 'basic civil rights
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."'2 3
Recognition of the right to privacy and freedom of choice in
matters relating to the education of one's children was implicit
in both Pierce v. Society of Sisters'4 and Meyer v. Nebraska.'-,
However, it is questionable whether any of the privacy
rights thus far recognized by the Court are applicable to the
issue of discrimination against children in rental housing. Two
reported decisions dealing with the constitutionality of restric-
tions excluding children from housing are illustrative of the
diversity of opinion which exists regarding this question.
120. Id. at 541. In Skinner, the Court banned sterilization as a punishment for
repeated criminal offenders.
121. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (striking
down mandatory maternity leave rules requiring pregnant schoolteachers to take un-
paid maternity leave four months before the expected date of childbirth); see Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that unmarried persons have the same
right of access to contraceptives as do married persons); see also Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state statute forbidding the use of contracep-
tives by married persons). Furthermore, a couple need not be married in order to assert
their rights to privacy and procreation.
Cf. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), in
which the California Supreme Court stated by way of dicta that:
[tihe fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear chil-
dren follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowl-
edgment of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage,
family, and sex. [citations]. That such a right is not enumerated in
either the United States or California Constitutions is no impediment to
the existence of the right.
Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199-200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
122. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
123. Id. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
124. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a state statute which required
children to attend only public schools, on the ground that the act "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control").
125. 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (overturning a state statute which prohibited
instruction in modern languages other than English to schoolchildren prior to the ninth
grade as violative of the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children).
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In Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 2 the Flor-
ida Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a restrictive cove-
nant contained in a condominium association's bylaws forbid-
ding residency by families with children under twelve years of
age was an unconstitutional violation of residents' rights to
marry and to procreate." 7 On petition for rehearing brought by
the condominium association, the court expanded its listing of
applicable fundamental rights to include the right of privacy,
the right of travel, the right of freedom of choice concerning
family living relationships,' and the right of parents to super-
vise their children's education and to enjoy their companion-
ship. 2 9
Conversely, in Riley v. Stoves, 130 an Arizona appellate
court applied the minimal rational basis standard of review in
upholding a private covenant restricting occupancy of units in
a mobile home subdivision to persons twenty-one years of age
and older.' The court determined that the restriction based on
age was reasonably related to the legitimate objective of creat-
ing a "quiet, peaceful neighborhood by eliminating noise asso-
ciated with children at play or otherwise."' 32
126. 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rehearing denied, 358 So. 2d 1089
(1978).
127. Id. at 1088.
128. The Franklin court cited Moore v: City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977), in support of their assertion that the right of freedom of choice concerning
family living relationships is a fundamental right. 358 So. 2d at 1090 n.12. In Moore,
the Supreme Court invalidated a local housing ordinance that limited occupancy of
dwelling units to members of a single family, but defined "family" in such narrow
terms that the appellant was subjected to criminal prosecution for allowing her son
and her two grandsons (who were first cousins rather than brothers) to reside with her.
431 U.S. at 496 n.2. The Court noted in Moore that "when the government intrudes
on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully
the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they
are served by the challenged regulation." Id. at 499.
129. 358 So. 2d at 1089-90. In another 1977 case involving a similar condominium
use restriction, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal upheld the age restriction
contained in the condominium agreement without any discussion of constitutional
issues. See Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
The Franklin court concluded that its decision was not in conflict with Coquina Club,
because in Coquina Club the validity of the age-based restrictions was "only a
'subsidiary question' and was not 'dispositive of the primary issue.'" 358 So. 2d at
1090.
130. 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
131. Id. at 228, 526 P.2d at 752. Apparently the plaintiff in Riley did not even
argue that any fundamental rights-triggering the stricter standard of review-were
applicable. Id. at 228 n.2, 526 P.2d at 52 n.2. Hence, the court did not even discuss
the issue.
132. See id. at 228, 526 P.2d at 752. The Riley court placed principle reliance on
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), noting that there was little, if any,
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The obvious conclusion from these opposite results
reached by the courts in Franklin and Riley is that housing
discrimination against families is not likely to be construed as
violative of equal protection principles so long as the minimal
rational basis standard of review is applied. The Riley court
was no doubt correct in asserting that providing a peaceable
and quiet environment for adults is a permissible and reasona-
ble objective. Conversely, if a fundamental right is determined
to be applicable when families are denied rental housing solely
because they have children, the Franklin court no doubt cor-
rectly concluded that such discrimination cannot withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny accorded to fundamental rights.
In light of the fact that recent Supreme Court decisions
have demonstrated a marked reluctance to expand the scope
of rights deemed "fundamental,' 3 3 it is doubtful whether dis-
crimination against families in rental housing will be generally
subjected to "strict scrutiny"-the decision in Franklin not-
withstanding.
Due Process: The Irrebuttable Presumption Argument
Absent the presence of any fundamental personal rights or
liberties, a challenge to state action on substantive due process
grounds will not succeed unless it can be demonstrated that the
particular state action being challenged is wholly arbitrary or
capricious.' 34 As with equal protection claims not involving any
suspect classifications or fundamental interests, the state ac-
tion is presumed valid and will be upheld unless no reasonable
set of facts can be conceived of which would support the action,
or unless it bears no rational relation to the goal sought.':15
Under this standard of review the chance of successful substan-
tive due process claims being advanced by families facing dis-
crimination in rental housing appears remote.
However, in several recent cases in which the interests at
stake were important, although not recognized by the Supreme
Court as fundamental, the Court has invalidated stated classi-
fications on the ground that they improperly created
"conclusive" or "irrebuttable" presumptions.:' The reasoning
distinction between the private age-based restriction at issue in Riley, and the zoning
ordinance in Belle Terre which prohibited the occupancy of a single dwelling by more
than two unrelated persons. 22 Ariz. App. at 228, 526 P.2d at 752-53.
133. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
134. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1922).
135. Id. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934).
136. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (striking
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of the Court is that when all persons within the classification
established by the state do not automatically fit within the
criteria on which the classification is based, procedural due
process requires that individuals be given a hearing and an
opportunity to prove that they do not fit within the classifica-
tion. 37
For example, if the objective of a landlord in excluding
children from his apartments is to provide a peaceable and
quiet environment for his tenants, a child-no matter how
quiet-is automatically excluded; an adult-no matter how
noisy or destructive-is not. Therefore, it could be argued that
the attempt to preserve an atmosphere of tranquility in an
apartment complex by barring all children, while not automat-
ically excluding others who would be just as noisy and destruc-
tive, is not a rational means of attaining that end. The issue
then becomes one of the overall reasonableness of the restric-
tion against children. In California, at least, the courts have
demonstrated a great willingness to find that age-based restric-
tions in housing accommodations are reasonable and rationally
related to the services performed and the facilities provided.1:
SUGGESTIONS FOR ALLEVIATING THE PROBLEM
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, it is difficult to
support the contention that there -are currently any valid statu-
tory or constitutional grounds to prevent a California landlord
from refusing to rent to a family, or to prevent an eviction
based on the fact that the tenants have children. In light of the
fact that the problems presented by discrimination against
families in rental housing are substantial and of concern to a
significant segment of society, there is a genuine need to take
steps to alleviate the problem.
down school board rules requiring all pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave
four months before the expected date of childbirth); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973) (invalidating irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for entire period of edu-
cation for out of state applicants to state university); United States Dep't of Agricul-
ture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (conclusive presumption that any household claim-
ing a tax dependent over age eighteen was not in need of food stamps held improper);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating a statute which automatically
separated illegitimate children from their father's custody upon the death of their
mother). But see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (provision of the Social
Security Act which denied benefits to wives and stepchildren who were such for less
than nine months prior to the wage earner's death held to be justified by its ease and
certainty of operation despite conclusive presumption created that marriages within
nine months of death were undertaken solely to secure benefits).
137. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-58 (1972).
138. See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
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The most direct way of dealing with the situation would
appear to be for the California Legislature to enact legislation
prohibiting such discrimination. Currently, there are several
bills under consideration in the California Assembly which are
designed to do just that.'39 However, in light of the rather lim-
ited success which such statutes have enjoyed in other states,""
as well as the very real dangers of political and social backlash
from other segments of the population,' it is perhaps advisa-
ble for California and other states to look first to other alterna-
tives before attempting to solve the problem of rental housing
discrimination against families by means of a sweeping state-
wide legislative prohibition of such discrimination.
Solutions on the local level-city and county-would seem
to be a better alternative than state-wide legislation.'42 The
primary reason is that the problems faced by families in finding
adequate rental housing differ greatly according to geographi-
cal location. In most rural areas and even in a few urban areas,
the problem may well be non-existent.'' However, in the
densely populated urban regions of southern California, the
proportion of total rental housing catering to families is as low
as twenty percent in some areas.'" Attacking the problem on
the local level allows greater flexibility in dealing with a com-
plex issue.
In many areas, a preferable alternative to an outright ban
against discrimination against children in rental housing might
be for local governments to take positive steps to encourage the
139. See note 12 supra.
140. Currently, six states have such statutes. See note 4 supra. Although some
of these statutes have been in effect for a number of years, their effectiveness has been
questioned. For example, one recent comprehensive study of the Illinois statute con-
cluded that it "is not a viable statute whatsoever." O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment
for Rent-Children Not Allowed, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 64, 86 (1975). Under the Illinois
statute, the state's attorneys are the only persons empowered to investigate and prose-
cute violations of the statute. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, § 5 (1973). The survey conducted
by O'Brien and Fitzgerald showed that from 1970 through 1975, only two consumer
complaints occurred statewide. O'Brien & Fitzgerald, supra at 83.
141. For example, all recent efforts to push through the California Legisla-
ture legislation banning discrimination against children in rental housing have been
vigorously and successfully opposed by the powerful real estate and landlord lobby.
See Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1978, § 4, at 4, col. 1 (View).
142. For a discussion of the relative pros and cons of local action as opposed to
state action see Note, Housing Discrimination Against Children: The Legal Status of
a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 575-76 (1977-1978).
143. Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1978, § 4, at 4, col. 1 (View). Sacramento has
been cited as one urban area in California where there is not a shortage of apartments
for children. Id.
144. Id. at 1, col. 1.
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building of more apartments catering to children. This is the
suggestion offered by one landlords' organization, the Califor-
nia Apartment Association."' This alternative would provide
rental housing for tenants with children, rather than concen-
trating on fining or punishing landlords who do not comply
with anti-discrimination ordinances. Local action-either in-
centives to construct new or to convert already-existing rental
housing reserved for tenants with children, or mandatory reser-
vation of a percentage of rental housing for tenants with chil-
dren-would be the action most likely to achieve the desired
goal of increased rental housing for tenants with children.
While such action would impose restrictions on a landlord's
choice of tenants, the inconvenience could be minimized by
''sectioning off" a portion of the rental building for tenants
with children. The net effect would be to provide some rental
housing for families with children without imposing overly se-
vere requirements or sanctions on landlords.
Local action to alleviate the problem, regardless of
whether that action takes the form of zoning, a housing ordi-
nance, steps to encourage construction of more family apart-
ments, or other similar actions, will hopefully result in more
effective solutions to the problem, as well as more effective
implementation of those solutions. Since the problems faced by
families seeking rental housing vary from one area to the next,
implementation and enforcement of solutions on the local level
allows local governments to tailor their approach to best suit
the needs of that locale.
Even more importantly, local governments acting individ-
ually can more completely and equitably balance the rights
and needs of families seeking rental housing against therights
and desires of other segments of the local population. Adults
who wish to live in retirement or adult-only housing develop-
ments, as well as landlords who wish to avoid the added bur-
dens and costs associated with the presence of children in
rental housing, also have constitutional and statutory rights
which must be respected. Additionally, they constitute a politi-
145. In the words of a spokesperson for that organization:
Very few people in the [apartment] industry will dispute that there is
a problem. There isn't enough family housing. But, by excluding the right
of the adult to live in an adult atmosphere, that isn't right either. A lot
of apartment complexes aren't geared for children. They are rather a
disturbing element. We would like to encourage more apartment building
for children rather than legislation restricting property rights.
Id. at 4, col. 1.
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cal force to be reckoned with and consulted if attempts to pro-
vide additional rental opportunitites for families are to prove
viable.
At the present time there are indications that more Cali-
fornia communities, spurred on in part by activist renters' or-
ganizations, are taking the initiative to tackle the problem as
it exists in their area. At least three California jurisdictions,
Berkeley, San Francisco and Santa Clara County, presently
have ordinances restricting discrimination against children in
rental housing.'48 In Los Angeles, a city councilwoman has pro-
posed a similar ordinance on which hearings are presently be-
ing held. 4' However, there is evidence that the city ordinances
existing in Berkeley and San Francisco are not very effective.
Under the San Francisco ordinance, for example, there has
only been one fine imposed against a landlord for discriminat-
ing against children in the three years that the ordinance has
been in existence.' 48
Hopefully, within the next few years the overall result of
these efforts will be a more equitable balancing of the rights
and needs of all individuals involved. It seems that the solu-
tions, at this point, depend on affirmative legislation or local
action which would -increase the amount of rental housing
available to tenants with children, and the efficient enforce-
ment of these regulations.
146. See BERKELEY, CAL., MUNI. CODE ch. 13.24.010-070 (1975); SAN FRANCISCO,
CAL., POLICE CODE art. 1.2, §§ 100-108 (1976); Santa Clara County, Cal., Ordinance
NS-628 (Feb. 20, 1979).
147. Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1978, § 4, at 9, col. 1.
148. See California Apartment Association Newsletter, vol. 4, no. 9 (July 1978).
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